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Shannon’s information theory has been a popular component of first-order cybernetics. It quantifies 
information transmitted in terms of the number of times a sent symbol is received as itself, or as 
another possible symbol. Sent symbols were events and received symbols were outcomes. Garner 
and Hake reinterpreted Shannon, describing events and outcomes as categories of a stimulus 
attribute, so as to quantify the information transmitted in the psychologist’s category (or absolute 
judgment) experiment. There, categories are represented by specific stimuli, and the human subject 
must assign those stimuli, singly and in random order, to the categories that they represent. 
Hundreds of computations ensued of information transmitted and its alleged asymptote, the sensory 
channel capacity. The present paper critically re-examines those estimates. It also reviews estimates 
of memory capacity from memory experiments. It concludes that absolute judgment is memory-
limited and that channel capacities are actually memory capacities. In particular, there are factors 
that affect absolute judgment that are not explainable within Shannon’s theory, factors such as 
feedback, practice, motivation, and stimulus range, as well as the anchor effect, sequential 
dependences, the rise in information transmitted with the increase in number of stimulus 
dimensions, and the phenomena of masking and stimulus duration dependence. It is recommended 
that absolute judgments be abandoned, because there are already many direct estimates of memory 
capacity.
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Introduction: Cybernetics, Information Theory, and Psychology
In 1948, Professor Norbert Wiener published Cybernetics, or Control and
Communication in the Animal and the Machine (Wiener, 1948/1961) and Dr. Claude
Shannon published “A Mathematical Theory of Communication” (Shannon, 1948/
1974). In 1951, Garner and Hake published “The Amount of Information in Absolute
Judgments” (Garner & Hake, 1951). The three publications are intimately related.
Regarding information, Wiener’s introduction noted that
We had to develop a statistical theory of the amount of information, in which the unit amount of
information was that transmitted as a single decision between equally probable alternatives. This
idea occurred at about the same time to several writers, among them the statistician R.A. Fisher, Dr.
Shannon of the Bell Telephone Laboratories, and the author. (Wiener, 1961, p. 10)
Garner and Hake (1951) introduced an experimental method that allowed a Shannon
information theory analysis of “how much information an O [observer] obtained about
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perception. The Garner and Hake approach was quickly and widely accepted in
experimental psychology. To date, hundreds of experiments have been done, and
concurrent estimates of information-transmitted made, using the Garner and Hake
approach. But from the start, theorists expressed reservations about what the Garner
and Hake approach actually quantifies (e.g., Cronbach, 1955). Thus, an important
question remains: Do we need an alternate interpretation of what the Garner and Hake
approach actually does, and if so, can a convincing one be constructed? The present
paper answers those questions without presenting new experimental data; it turns out
that more than enough already exists in the literature.
The Broad Constituency for the Garner-Hake Information Measure
Why should we care about the Garner and Hake (1951) measure of information
transmission? Because it has been enormously influential in the study of behavior, and
it continues to be so. As the psychology historian Alan Collins noted, “By the mid-
1950s ‘information’ was so deeply embedded in the technical vocabulary of
psychology that it has remained there ever since” (Collins, 2007, p. 67). The Garner-
Hake measure appears in contemporary textbooks and is taught in classrooms. A
search of the ISI database reveals that Garner and Hake (1951) has been cited at least
171 times to date in psychology papers, reviews, and abstracts. However, that citation
count is misleadingly small. In fact, the chosen reference of those using the Garner-
Hake computations is the first review of the method and its results, that of Miller
(1956a), whose highly readable summary has been cited at least 4,589 times to date.
Furthermore, the citing constituency is truly enormous, covering psychology, systems
theory, management, information engineering, human factors, music, neurology, and
general cybernetics. The present paper will focus on the core papers, those published
in psychology and concerning “normal” experimental subjects. Attneave (1959)
produced a compact book on the computation of the information transmitted in
psychology experiments, which (unlike Miller) included a detailed description of all
of the algebra needed for calculating information transmitted. Attneave (1959) has
been cited at least 809 times to date.
The information measure that Garner and Hake introduced and that was
popularized by Miller (1956a) and Attneave (1959) catered to the contemporary desire
to describe the brain as an information-processing machine. That desire has not
waned. But despite the ongoing interest in the Garner-Hake method, there has been a
slow creeping realization that it has not revealed how the brain processes information.
Nobody seems to understand why. It seems both important and startling that the brain
apparently does not obey a model of information processing for which the
experimental conditions appear to be explicitly designed. The present paper offers an
explanation that, remarkably, may have been sitting in plain sight all along. It starts
with the realization that neither of Garner and Hake (1951) nor Miller (1956a) nor
Attneave (1959) provided any actual mathematical or logic proof that the Garner-
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correct, and nobody questioned the assumption.
Before proceeding to the analysis of the Garner-Hake approach, the author
recognizes that there was a concurrent parallel application of Shannon information
theory to psychology, that begun by Hick (1952). Hick studied choice reaction times.
Many others took up the approach, and it became so popular that the Cambridge
mathematician Donald Laming devoted an entire book to it (Laming, 1968). Later,
however, Luce (2003) cites Laming as expressing extreme doubts about the whole
approach. Note also that there was yet another parallel track, one in which Shannon
information theory was applied to the firing of neurons (e.g., MacKay & McCulloch,
1952). That application, too, may prove to be irrelevant (e.g., Andrew, 1984), and is
sufficiently complicated as to require a detailed separate examination; an adequate
treatment of the topic is well beyond the scope of the present paper.
In composing the present paper, the author could have used any and all of a
number of psychology review papers that have appeared in the literature over the
years since Miller (1956a). Some of those reviews are quite recent. They cover a
wealth of experimental results. But all the reviews start with the stipulation that the
Garner-Hake method quantifies transmitted information. Perhaps because of this, the
reviewers concluded their reviews by expressing frustrations, rather than conclusions,
about why the Garner-Hake method did not revolutionize our understanding of the
brain. The present author felt that trying to summarize a plethora of opinions would
only introduce needless confusion. Rather, a fresh essay was undertaken, by returning
to the basics. Wever and Zener (1928) popularized the experimental method that was
later used by Garner and Hake (1951). Shannon (1948/1974) provided the algebra that
Garner and Hake used to process their data. Three contemporaries, Eriksen, Hake, and
Pollock (all to be cited below), did much of the seminal early work that is still cited as
archetypal. Not all of the instructive literature is old, however. The most recent paper
to be cited here was published in 2008. Nonetheless, the present paper’s reference list
is not a reflection of the rate of production of literature over time. Rather, the list is
necessarily bottom-heavy, because generally, the earlier the cited reference, the more
likely it was that its authors chose to cross-examine the behavior of transmitted
information in absolute judgments, rather than taking it for granted. The earlier
literature was therefore more likely to supply evidence, if only inadvertently, for
alternative hypotheses about what the Garner-Hake analysis of absolute judgments
was actually measuring.
Presently, short quotations will be used to introduce the various investigators’
own words, to represent the flavor of the concepts as they were originally laid down,
and to give credit where credit is due. Special consideration is given to the present
author’s own field, the psychology of hearing, which attracted more use of the Garner-
Hake method than did vision, taste, smell, skin sensation, motion, or kinesthesis, the
other senses to be discussed.
It was felt necessary to review the 60 years of experimental literature that favored
the information theory interpretation, in order to demonstrate that (1) such an
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alternative interpretation that is well justified.
Cybernetics Background (1): A Very Brief Review of Shannon’s General
Communication System
Shannon (1948/1974) wished to quantify the amount of information transmitted
through a general communication system. Shannon gave a simple box-and-stick
model of his system. The present author used Shannon’s accompanying description of
his model to produce a somewhat more explanatory illustration of the Shannon
system. Figure 1 shows the Shannon system. According to Shannon, a message from a
source is passed to a transmitter, which transmits through a channel to a receiver,
which passes the received message to a destination. Probabilities lead to information
as follows (Shannon, 1948/1974): n events are possible; the event that occurs is the
outcome. When n > 1, the outcome is uncertain. What is certain is each event’s
probability of occurrence, pi , i = 1,..., n. Figure 2 illustrates these ideas.
Shannon argued that (1) uncertainty must be a continuous function of the pi ,
(2) when all events are equiprobable (pi = 1/n), then uncertainty must increase
monotonically with n, and finally (3) uncertainty must be the same whether the
outcome occurred through a single step, or through successive steps. Shannon proved
that the requisite [amount of] uncertainty, choice, or information, called the stimulus
information IS , is
Shannon noted that K’s value can be adjusted to reflect the choice of units. He
set K = 1. Shannon proved that when pi = (1/n) for all i, IS is maximal, thus IS = log n.
Events can be symbols k, in which case
Cybernetics Background (2): Information Transmitted and the Confusion Matrix
Shannon’s Computation of Information Transmitted
Shannon (1948/1974) assumed that, for simplicity’s sake, any symbol received is one
of the set of symbols sent. Not all symbols will be received as transmitted; unintended
errors occur. Let the probability of transmission of symbol k given reception of
symbol j be denoted p j (k). Then
0.K   constant,  is  KplogpKI
n
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Altogether, It can be computed knowing (a) what symbols were transmitted, (b) what
symbols were received, and (c) for each symbol sent and each symbol received, the
number of times that the latter corresponded to the former. Those values are the
elements of the confusion matrix.
The confusion matrix in Shannon’s computation of information transmitted
The confusion matrix has columns labelled by the symbol sent (the event) and rows
labelled by the symbol received (the outcome). Each matrix entry is the number of
times that the particular outcome corresponded to the particular event. Figure 3 shows
the Shannon confusion matrix for a set of transmitted symbols k. Non-zero
off-diagonal elements in the confusion matrix represent lack of transmission fidelity
(noisiness). When what is transmitted is identically received, all off-diagonal entries
are zero, and It  = IS .
Cybernetics Background (3): The Use of Shannon Information in Sensory
Psychology
The Conduct of the Category or Absolute Judgment or Absolute Identification
Experiment 
Garner and Hake (1951) introduced the use of Shannon’s information theory to
quantify a human subject’s performance in the sensory psychology experiment called
categorization, absolute identification, or absolute judgment. That type of experiment
predates Garner and Hake; indeed, it was reviewed in 1928 by Wever and Zener. In
absolute judgment, a set of sensory stimuli vary only in the attribute(s) of interest. For
simplicity, consider a single attribute, such as physical intensity. Other physical
aspects of the stimulus (such as frequency, for example, for a tone, or hue, for a color
or a light) are held constant. The experimenter partitions the continuum of the
stimulus attribute (the event continuum) into adjacent ranges called stimulus
categories. The experimenter chooses the total number of stimulus-attribute
categories to be used; for example, Garner (1953) used either of 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, or 20
categories. The latter were named or numbered, usually in a fashion consecutive with
increase in the magnitude of the attribute. For example, for intensity, the categories
could be labeled “very weak” to “very strong,” or perhaps 1-10 if there were 10
categories. From each category a value of the stimulus attribute was chosen; these
( ) ( ) py,inty/entroon/uncertaequivocatistimulustheiskplogkpE
j k
jjS (3)∑∑−=
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (4).kplogkpkplogkpEIIdtransmitteninformatio
j k
jj
k
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6 Lance Nizamiwere the experimental stimuli, the chosen members of the stimulus continuum. Garner
and Hake (1951, p. 452) explained that “we are representing ranges or classes of
events with a single stimulus value.”2
Figure 1. A general communication system (after Shannon, 1948/1974), to which Shannon applied his
information theory. Quoting from Shannon, the system comprises (1) “An information source which
produces a message or sequence of messages to be communicated to the receiving terminal” (Shannon,
p. 5); (2) “A transmitter which operates on the message in some way to produce a signal suitable for
transmission over the channel” (p. 5); (3) “The channel is merely the medium used to transmit the signal
from transmitter to receiver” (p. 5); (4) “The receiver ordinarily performs the inverse operation of that
done by the transmitter, reconstructing the message from the signal” (p. 5); and finally (5) “The
destination is the person (or thing) for whom the message is intended” (p. 5).
The principle behind absolute judgment was well described by Gibson (1953, p. 408):
given a sensory stimulus, such as color or odor or weight, “The range of stimuli may
be placed along a dimension or continuum; furthermore, the responses which O [the
subject or observer] is to learn may be scaled and placed in a consistent relationship or
correlation with the stimulus continuum.” Each subject is given an orientation session
in which each category is represented by a stimulus from that category. The
presentation order of the stimuli is always randomized according to the physical
attribute that is varied. There is also a set of response categories, which are adjacent
ranges of the stimulus attribute continuum, just like the stimulus categories. The
subject states the response category that they believe a given stimulus belongs to (the
act of categorization or absolute judgment). The number of response categories need
not equal the number of stimulus categories. For example, the experimental subject
might be asked to assign 10 different stimuli, representing respectively 10 stimulus
2. The ultimate limit of the size of any category is the psychophysical just-noticeable-difference (jnd), whose value 
can presently only be established through experimentation. 
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(one for each stimulus category) does not equal the number of possible responses (the
number of response categories). The subject must forcibly evenly distribute the
stimuli among the response categories. How that mismatch affects It was thoroughly
investigated by Eriksen and Hake (1955a), who found that It tended to be highest
when stimulus and response categories were equal in number. That condition quickly
became the norm, such that each subject’s task became merely to correctly identify the
presented stimuli, the task called absolute identification. The subject repeats that
entire process until no further improvement in their performance is apparent. The
subject’s performance on that preliminary experiment is used to construct an equal-
discriminability scale of the stimulus attribute for that subject (viz., Garner, 1952).
Stimuli equidistant on that scale are used for the remainder of the experiment (the
trials from which final Its are computed) because they should be the easiest to
discriminate, hence giving the maximum It . Once again, subjects practice the task
first. For most stimuli (e.g. auditory tone frequency and intensity, brightness and hue
of colors, concentration of tastants or odorants), equal discriminability amounted to
equal spacing along logarithmic scales of the physical variable. The exceptions were
such things as length or distance judgments, and kinesthetic judgments involving
muscular force (e.g., lifted weights), for which equal spacing on linear scales was
used.3
3. The effect of stimulus range on It was examined by Bechinger, Kongehl, and Kornhuber (1969) for 3 sensory 
modalities —time perception, perception of rotary accelerations, and length—and for three distributions of 
stimuli: linear, power function, and exponential. They found that It was worst for a linear distribution, was best 
for a power function distribution for one modality (they did not say which), and was best for an exponential 
distribution for the other two modalities. Remember that an exponential distribution is equivalent to a linear 
distribution in a logarithmic scale. Thus Bechinger et al. confirmed the long-held view that absolute judgment is 
easiest when stimuli are spaced equally along a logarithmic scale.
8 Lance NizamiFigure 2. Events and outcomes.
Events and Transmitters According to Garner and Hake: Conjoining Information
Theory and Perception
One of the principle concepts that Garner and Hake (1951) used to connect Shannon
information to psychology was that “the stimulus can be thought of as an event which
occurs with a certain probability” (Garner & Hake, 1951, p. 446). Figure 4 shows the
Garner and Hake model in terms of elements of their category experiment. For any
particular stimulus attribute, Garner and Hake illustrated an event continuum, such
that events had any possible value of the stimulus attribute of interest. From the event
continuum, specific stimulus values were drawn at regular intervals. These were
deemed members of the stimulus continuum. Each chosen stimulus projects to a
response continuum, thus being an intermediate between event and response. Because
the stimuli in an absolute judgment experiment are presented one at a time, each
stimulus in turn becomes the transmitter, the component of the Shannon general
communication system that operates on an event to make an outcome. The computed
value of It then expresses “the amount of information about the event continuum
which a particular range of stimulus values [those used in the experiment] can
transmit” (Garner & Hake, 1951, p. 452) or “the amount of information which the
stimuli transmit to an O” (p. 452). For example, Hartman, whose subjects judged tone
frequency (pitch naming), noted that “we were to regard our [nine] tones as
representing nine items of knowledge about a particular continuum” (Hartman, 1954,
p. 6).
Event #
A fter:  The outcome = one of the events
(gain of information, reduction of uncertainty)
Before: events with probabilities
n
pi
1
0
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Channel Capacity or Memory Capacity? 9Figure 3. The Shannon confusion matrix. Njk = the number of times a symbol transmitted as k is received
as j . p(j) = Nj. /N = the probability that j was received; p(k) = N.k /N = the probability that k was
transmitted; pk (j) = Njk /N.k = the probability that j was received if k was transmitted; and pj (k) = Njk /Nj.
= the probability that k was transmitted, if j was received.
If the stimulus was the transmitter in the absolute judgment experiment, what then
were the other components of the Shannon general communication system (figure 1),
that is, the source, channel, receiver, and destination? The experimenter determines
what the subjects judge, and is therefore the source of the message (the string of
successive stimuli). If the stimulus is the transmitter, then the subject must be some or
all of the remaining components of the system. But it is the experimenter who decodes
(receives) the message, recording the subject’s responses, and computing the
information transmitted. The experimenter is also the destination. Thus the human
subject is the channel. Garner and Hake (1951) actually explained little about the role
of the human experimental subject in a communication system. Miller (1956b) stated
what Garner and Hake (1951) had likely been thinking: “If a human operator is
regarded as a communication channel with stimuli for inputs and responses for
outputs, it is possible to estimate maximum rates of transmission through him”
(Miller, 1956b, p. 129). That is, what is computed from the psychologist’s confusion
matrix is “the amount of information transmitted (by the human channel) from the set
of stimuli to the set of responses” (Landau, Buchsbaum, Coppola, & Sihvonen, 1974,
-------
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10 Lance Nizamip. 239) or, as Kintz, Parker, and Boynton (1969, p. 241) put it, the “information
transmitted through the subject.”
The Confusion Matrix for Absolute Judgments
Garner and Hake computed information transmitted using Shannon’s algebra
(described above), but the confusion matrix for absolute judgments differs from that
of Shannon (1948/1974) for transmission of symbols, as follows: The Garner-Hake
confusion matrix has columns labelled by stimulus category, and rows labelled by
response category. That is, stimulus categories are treated as Shannon events and
response categories are treated as Shannon outcomes. Each matrix entry is the number
of times that a stimulus taken from the respective stimulus category was classified by
the subject as falling within the respective response category. Figure 5 shows the
Garner-Hake confusion matrix. The transmitted information It computed from the
matrix entries represents “how accurately the O [observer] perceived which of several
alternative stimuli occurred on a particular presentation, or how much information the
O obtained about which stimulus occurred” (Garner & Hake, 1951, p. 459). Recall
that the matrix entries are used to compute the elements of equation (4), from which It
is obtained. Base 2 was typically usually used for the logarithms of equation (4), so
that information transmitted was quantified in binary units per stimulus, or bits/
stimulus, the units adopted henceforth. As Landau et al. (1974, p. 239) succinctly
explained, “The transmission of one bit of information per stimulus is equivalent to
the perfect identification of two stimulus categories; transmission of two bits/stimulus
to perfect identification of four categories and so on.”
The Sensory Channel Capacity
Early on, a limit was assumed to the amount of information transmitted through the
subject. Miller explained the concept, which had escaped mention by Garner and
Hake:
If the human observer is a reasonable kind of communication system, then when we increase the
amount of input information the transmitted information will increase at first and will eventually
level off at some asymptotic value. This asymptotic value we take to be the channel capacity of the
observer... (Miller, 1956a, p. 82)
That is, when the number of categories is small enough and each category is wide
enough, the subject will make no errors, and information transmitted It will equal the
information available from the distribution of the presentation probabilities of the
stimulus, the stimulus information IS (equation 2). As the number of categories
increases for a fixed range of the stimulus attribute, the subject more frequently makes
mistakes, assigning stimuli to the wrong categories. It may nonetheless increase
because the number of stimuli increases with the number of categories, hence there is
more stimulus information (equation 2). At some point, however, further subdivision
of the event (stimulus attribute) continuum into narrower and narrower categories
Channel Capacity or Memory Capacity? 11(hence more and more given stimuli) can extract no more information. It will plateau,
its asymptote dubbed the channel capacity, a notion that was especially encouraged by
Miller (1956a) and by Alluisi (1957). Figure 6 illustrates channel capacity. Miller’s
(1956a) summary of the early literature led him to state that
On the basis of the present evidence it seems safe to say that we possess a finite and rather small
capacity for making such unidimensional judgments and that this capacity does not vary a great deal
from one simple sensory attribute to another. (Miller, 1956a, p. 86)
Miller’s estimate of the channel capacity was 7 ± 2 categories, memorialized for
psychology students the world over in the title of his paper, “The Magical Number
Seven, Plus or Minus Two.” Miller’s estimate corresponds to a lower limit of 2.32
bits/stimulus, a mean value of 2.81 bits/stimulus, and an upper limit of 3.17 bits/
stimulus. Miller’s paper encouraged further estimates of channel capacity from
absolute judgments because, as MacRae (1970a, p. 112) noted: “The quantitative
correspondence between quite different sensory modalities with this technique
(Miller, 1956) made it seem likely that some fundamental aspect of performance was
being measured.” Tables 1, 2, and 3 detail the maximum empirical Its for a broad
range of absolute judgment experiments. The Tables show that the experiments were
spread over a great span of time, over many laboratories, and over a vast variety of
different stimulus conditions. Only tabulated are Its that were explicitly specified by
their discoverers. In contrast, some well-known papers only presented measurements
as data points, from which It is too difficult to infer. The number of studies differs by
sensory modality, reflecting the different degrees of interest given to those modalities.
Regardless of modality, the early measurements of It cluster around 2-3 bits/stimulus,
corresponding to 4-8 correctly identified stimuli. This is the quantitative
correspondence to which MacRae referred.
Problems Caused by the Empirical Behavior of Channel Capacity
The Actual Behavior of Information Transmitted With Increase in Number of Judged
Stimuli
Not everyone accepted the notion of a channel capacity in absolute judgments. A well-
cited early proceeding on the use of information theory in psychology contained the
first, albeit thinly-veiled, criticism of channel capacity. Therein, Lee J. Cronbach
noted: “Pseudo-constancies can arise because of the way measuring procedures are
devised, or from balancing of opposing effects. In many studies where some degree of
invariance is reported, the experimental design has been insufficiently penetrating”
(Cronbach, 1955, p. 15). The significance of the latter sentence, in particular, should
soon become apparent in light of the actual behavior of It with increase in number of
stimuli. It does not always follow the behavior which had been prescribed by Miller
(1956a) and Alluisi (1957). For example, in audition, Pollack (1952) computed It for
identification by frequency of tones spanning 0.1-8 kHz. The number of tones judged
in any one stimulus series was either of 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, or 10. It rose with number of
12 Lance Nizamitones, reaching a maximum for 7 tones, then fell. In a similar experiment, in which
tones were presented through earphones rather than through a loudspeaker, the
number of tones in each series was either 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, or 14. It rose with number
of tones, reaching a maximum for 7, then declined, but suddenly rose again for 14. A
peak in the plot of It versus number of judged stimuli is also evident for visual stimuli;
the Its for color identification of spots of light of 430-642 nanometers wavelength
varied from 3.20 bits/stimulus for 10 colors to 3.35 for 12 colors to 3.66 for 15 colors
to 3.20 for 17 colors (Chapanis & Halsey, 1956). Similar behavior was found for odor
intensity. Engen and Pfaffmann (1959) had a single, well-practiced subject identify the
odor of amyl acetate (banana) when 3, 5, 7, 10, or 13 concentrations were presented. It
peaked for 7 concentrations and then gently declined. The same pattern of rise and
slow fall was found by Beebe-Center, Rogers, and O’Connell (1955) for the intensity
of salt taste using either of 3, 5, 9, or 17 saline solutions.
Figure 4. Information transmission in perception according to Garner and Hake (1951), illustrated here
for 7 categories. For the stimulus attribute of interest (for example, physical intensity), and for each
experimental subject, preliminary testing allows the experimenter to choose stimuli at equal increments
along an equal-discriminability scale. Each such stimulus represents a stimulus category, and transmits
information about the continuum of the attribute. Stimuli are presented to the subject in random order and
the subject states what they think is the corresponding category (dashed lines). The subject sometimes
makes mistakes, assigning stimuli to the wrong category.
But the empirical behavior of It is anything but clear in the literature. Sometimes It
seems to gradually asymptote with increase in number of stimuli, and sometimes it
seems to peak and decline. But there is a resolution of the conundrum, which lies
within statistical arguments. An unintentional clue to that resolution was provided by
Garner (1953) whose subjects identified tones of 15-110 dB SPL according to
perceived intensity (i.e., loudness). The number of stimuli judged per listening session
was either of 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, or 20. Garner processed the subjects’ accuracy scores by
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Channel Capacity or Memory Capacity? 13two methods: first, he gathered all judgments across-subjects and computed It from
that data mass; also, he computed It separately for each subject, subject-by-subject,
and then averaged across subjects. For Garner’s computations from mass data, It
peaked for 5 given stimuli (It = 2.32 bits/stimulus) and then continuously declined,
reaching 1.62 bits/stimulus (3 categories) for 20 given stimuli. Conversely, for the
computations done subject-by-subject, the across-subject average It appeared to
asymptote rather than peak. Clearly, the two methods of computation yielded different
results. In fact, the majority of studies compute It using Garner’s second method,
perhaps because sometimes a separate equal-discriminability scale (and hence a
different set of stimuli) had been constructed for each subject.
Figure 5. Garner and Hake’s (1951) version of the Shannon confusion matrix. Njk = the number of times a
stimulus from category k was stated by the subject as being in category j . p(j) = Nj. /N = the probability
that the subject stated that the stimulus was of category j; p(k) = N.k /N = the probability that the stimulus
of category k was presented; pk (j) = Njk /N.k = the probability that category j was stated when the
stimulus of category k was presented; and pj (k) = Njk /Nj. = the probability that the stimulus of category k
was given, if category j was stated.
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14 Lance NizamiFigure 6. Channel capacity: Miller (1956a), Alluisi (1957), and others postulated that It would increase as
the number of categories in a category experiment increased, and hence as the number of different
presented stimuli increased, eventually approaching a plateau value to be found through category
experiments.
Table 1: Maximum values of information transmitted, It  
in bits/stimulus, for hearing.*
Study Sense Frequency (Hz)
Duration 
(ms)
Feedback 
(Y/N/U)
It Note
Garner (1953) Loudness See note 1,000 U 2.32 a
Pollack (1953a) Pitch 100-8,000 2,500 Y 2.32 b
Pitch 60-14,000 2,500 Y 2.40 c
Pitch & 
loudness See note 2,500 Y 3.07 d
Tulving & 
Lindsay (1967) Loudness 1,000 20 Y 1.54 -
Loudness 1,000 50 Y 1.51 -
Loudness 1,000 2,000 Y 1.74 -
Pitch 100-1,000 50 Y 1.92 e
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Channel Capacity or Memory Capacity? 15Pitch 100-1,000 50 Y 1.62 f
Pitch 100-1,000 2,000 Y 1.98 e
Pitch 100-1,000 2,000 Y 1.89 f
Vianello & Evans 
(1968) Pitch See note See note N 2.38 g
Ward & Lockhead 
(1970) Loudness 1,000 100 Y 1.27 h
Loudness 1,000 100 N 0.95 h
Landau, 
Buchsbaum, 
Coppola, & 
Sihvonen (1974) 
Loudness 500 500 N 1.38 i
Fulgosi & Zaja 
(1975) Pitch 50-11,000 5,000 Y 3.092 j
Fulgosi, Bacun, & 
Zaja (1975)
Pitch & 
loudness See note 5,000 U 3.824 k
Locke (1975) Duration 1,000 See note U 2.13 l
McNicol (1975) Loudness 500 1,000 See note 1.73-1.90 m
Fulgosi, 
Knezovic, & 
Zarevski (1984)
Pitch 80-4,400 4,000 Y 3.30 n
Ward (1991) Loudness 1,000 See note Y 1.91 o
Loudness 1,000 See note Y 1.70 p
Mori & Ward 
(1992) Loudness 1,000 50 Y 1.5 q
Pitch 100-8,000 50 Y 2.31 -
Pitch 500-3,000 50 Y 2.02 -
Mori & Ward 
(1995) Loudness 1,000 500 See note 1.4 r
Loudness 1,000 500 See note 0.8 s
Pitch 100-8,000 500 See note 2.023 t
Table 1: Maximum values of information transmitted, It  
in bits/stimulus, for hearing.* (Continued)
Study Sense Frequency (Hz)
Duration 
(ms)
Feedback 
(Y/N/U)
It Note
16 Lance Nizami* Not all cited papers are discussed in the text, and vice versa. Whether feedback was given is 
indicated by Y (=Yes), N (=No), or U (=Unclear). Estimates may not have been corrected by 
their authors for the sampling bias noted by MacRae (1970a) and discussed in the text, 
which overestimates It.
Notes: a. Frequency of tone was not mentioned. Intensities of 15-110 dB SPL. b. Nine tones. 
c. Eleven tones. d. Five frequencies from 125-7,000 Hz, at each of 5 intensities from 20-90 
dB SPL. e. Tone intensity was 85 decibels above the detection threshold for a 1,500 Hz 
tone. f. Tone intensity was 15 decibels above the detection threshold for a 1,500 Hz tone. 
g. Pure tones corresponding to 3 musical scales from A to G. The authors did not state the 
tone duration. h. Ten intensities, centered on 60 dB SPL, 1 decibel apart. i. Square wave at 
62, 72, 79, 88, or 95 dB SPL. j. It  was averaged here over 5 subjects. k. It  was averaged 
here over 5 subjects. Frequencies from 250-3,000 Hz, at intensities that could differ slightly 
by frequency in order to achieve equal subjective intensity (i.e., loudness); see table I of 
Fulgosi et al. (1975). l. For normal subjects; 9 tones all at 70 dB SPL, equally spaced from 
100 ms to 1,900 ms duration. The 1,000 ms tone preceded each tone as a “mid-range 
anchor.” Without that anchor, It was 2.01 bits/stimulus. m. By subject group, subjects were 
either (1) given accurate feedback all the time, and were informed that the feedback was 
accurate, or (2) were given feedback that was correct on either 100%, 50%, or 20% of the 
trials, and informed only that the feedback might not be accurate, or (3) not given feedback 
at all. Respective Its were 1.87, 1.82, 1.85, 1.90, and 1.73 bits/stimulus. n. Median It for 5 
subjects. Feedback given in first half but not second half of experiment. o. Intensities of 40-
100 dB SPL in 3-dB steps; It averaged over durations of 15, 45, 135, 405, 1,215, and 3,645 
ms (stimulus duration was not statistically significant). p. Intensities of 45-95 dB SPL in 5-
dB steps; It averaged over durations of 15, 45, 135, 405, and 1,215 ms. q. Intensities of 65-
80 dB SPL in 3-dB steps. r. Intensities of 50-86 dB SPL in 4-dB steps; special test method 
in which sequences of judgments with feedback are alternated with sequences of judgments 
without feedback. s. Intensities of 77-86 dB SPL in 1-dB steps; special test method in which 
sequences of judgments with feedback are alternated with sequences of judgments without 
feedback. t. Six frequencies used; special test method in which sequences of judgments with 
feedback are alternated with sequences of judgments without feedback. u. Eleven 
frequencies used; special test method in which sequences of judgments with feedback are 
alternated with sequences of judgments without feedback. v. Sixteen frequencies used; 
special test method in which sequences of judgments with feedback are alternated with 
sequences of judgments without feedback. 
Pitch 100-8,000 500 See note 1.91 u
Pitch 100-8,000 500 See note 2.122 v
Table 1: Maximum values of information transmitted, It  
in bits/stimulus, for hearing.* (Continued)
Study Sense Frequency (Hz)
Duration 
(ms)
Feedback 
(Y/N/U)
It Note
Channel Capacity or Memory Capacity? 17Table 2: Maximum values of information transmitted, It  
in bits/stimulus, for vision.* 
Study Sense Wavelength (nm)
Duration 
(ms)
Feedback 
(Y/N/U)
It Note
Eriksen & Hake 
(1955a) Size See note See note N 2.08 a, b
Eriksen & Hake 
(1955b) Size See note See note N 2.84 a, c
Hue See note See note N 3.08 a, d
Brightness See note See note N 2.34 a, e
Size-hue See note See note N 1.92 a, f
Size-
brightness See note See note N 1.62 a, f
Hue-
brightness See note See note N 1.98 a, f
Size-hue-
brightness See note See note N 1.89
Chapanis & 
Halsey (1956) Hue 430-642 See note N 3.66 g
Pylyshyn & 
Agnew (1962) Distance See note 10 Y 3.32 h
Distance See note 1,000 Y 3.42 h
Keene (1963) Line slope N/A 2,500 N 3.00 i
Garner & 
Creelman 
(1964) 
Size See note See note Y 2.685 j, k
Hue See note See note Y 2.345 j
Size-hue See note See note Y 3.295 j
Lockhead 
(1966) Line length N/A 200 Y 1.07 l, m
Line position N/A 200 Y 0.99 l, n
Line length 
and position N/A 200 Y 1.22
l, m, 
n
Line length N/A 8 Y 0.19 m, o
Line position N/A 8 Y 0.47 n, o
18 Lance NizamiLine length 
and position N/A 8 Y 0.58
m, n, 
o
Feallock, 
Southard, 
Kobayashi, & 
Howell (1966)
Overall color N/A See note See note 4.32 p, q
Overall color N/A See note See note 4.59 p, r
Garner, Kaplan, 
& Creelman 
(1966)
Size See note See note Y 2.19 s
Friedman 
(1967) Line length N/A See note Y 4.26 t
Distance See note See note Y 5.48 u
Spitz (1967)
Pointer 
position 
along line
See note See note Y 3.43 v
Steedman 
(1967) Size See note 2,500 See note 3.38 w
Tulving & 
Lindsay (1967) Brightness See note 20 Y 1.86 x
Brightness See note 50 Y 1.84 x
Brightness See note 2,000 Y 2.16 x
Size N/A 50 Y 2.56 y
Size N/A 50 Y 2.51 z
Size N/A 2,000 Y 2.60 y
Size N/A 2,000 Y 2.77 z
Bevan & Avant 
(1968) Size See note See note U 2 aa
Egeth & 
Pachella (1969) Size N/A 1,000 Y 0.70 bb
Eccentricity N/A 125 Y 1.30 cc
Hue See note 125 Y 1.48 dd
Size N/A 1,000 Y 1.11 bb
Table 2: Maximum values of information transmitted, It  
in bits/stimulus, for vision.*  (Continued)
Study Sense Wavelength (nm)
Duration 
(ms)
Feedback 
(Y/N/U)
It Note
Channel Capacity or Memory Capacity? 19* Not all cited papers are discussed in the text, and vice versa. Whether feedback was given is 
indicated by Y (=Yes), N (=No), or U (=Unclear). Estimates may not have been corrected by 
their authors for the sampling bias noted by MacRae (1970a) and discussed in the text, 
which overestimates It .
Notes: a. Duration of stimulus exposure was not mentioned. b. It reported here is an average 
over two ranges of grey squares (2-42 mm/side and 2-82 mm/side) and three conditions (5 
stimuli and 5 response categories; 11 stimuli and 11 response categories; and 21 stimuli and 
21 response categories). The experiment was repeated by Eriksen and Wechsler (1955) 
using 11 stimuli and 11 response categories and squares of 20-50 mm/side in 3 mm 
increments; It = 1.87 bits/stimulus. c. Stimuli were 20 squares of dark grey paper, of 1/8 
inch per side up to 20/8 inches per side. d. Stimuli were 7/8 inch square Munsell papers (see 
text) having hues from red through yellow, green, and blue, to reddish purple. Brightness 
was held constant. e. Twenty brightnesses presented at a neutral hue. f. See explanation in 
text in section on stimuli that vary in more than one dimension. g. Self-paced, i.e., exposure 
determined by the subject. h. Twenty horizontal distances of 1.9 to 38 inches in 20 equal 
steps, between 2 white light spots in the dark. Subjects described as having “low anxiety 
score,” in contrast to patients showing high anxiety. i. It averaged over three different 
response codes. j. Stimuli were those of Eriksen and Hake (1955b, see table entries above) 
except that stimulus exposures were 40 ms and 100 ms. It was averaged for those exposures. 
Eccentricity N/A 125 Y 1.34 cc
Hue See note 125 Y 1.78 dd
Kintz, Parker, 
& Boynton 
(1969)
Hue 450-640 250 U 2.6 ee
Fulgosi & 
Bartolovic 
(1971)
Size See note See note Y 3.75 ff
Landau, 
Buchsbaum, 
Coppola, & 
Sihvonen 
(1974)
Line length N/A 500 N 2.07 gg
Brightness See note 500 N 1.21 hh
Fulgosi, 
Lugomer, & 
Fulgosi (1986)
Size N/A See note N 2.6 ii
Ward (1991) Brightness 565 See note Y 1.46 jj
Petrov & 
Anderson 
(2005)
Distance N/A 3,300 Y 1.68 kk
Table 2: Maximum values of information transmitted, It  
in bits/stimulus, for vision.*  (Continued)
Study Sense Wavelength (nm)
Duration 
(ms)
Feedback 
(Y/N/U)
It Note
20 Lance Nizamik. Squares were twice as large as those used by Eriksen and Hake (1955b). l. High viewing 
illumination. m. Lengths of 2.0-2.9 cm in 0.1-cm steps. n. Vertical position, changed in 10 
steps of 0.1 cm each. o. Low viewing illumination. p. Duration of stimulus exposure not 
mentioned. Feedback was given during training but not during testing. q. 10 subjects, 30 
colors. r. 16 subjects, 24 colors. s. Black square on white background, projected upon a 
ground-glass screen. “Stimuli were presented at the rate of approximately one every 7.5 
sec” (Garner et al., 1966, p. 637). t. Length of black horizontal line on white background. 
Duration not mentioned. Final performance of median subject. u Horizontal distance 
between small white-light bulbs seen as point sources. Duration not mentioned. Final 
performance of median subject. v. It is averaged over best subject group. Stimulus was a 
black vertical line (pointer) placed along a narrow white strip illuminated by white light. w. 
“Green” light of 400-650 nm wavelength. Feedback not given during early sessions, but 
given during later sessions. It is averaged over four subjects for later sessions. x. White light 
patch. y. Black circle on white background. Illumination level was 4.2 foot-candles. z. Black 
circle on white background. Illumination level was 0.003 foot-candles. aa. Projected gray 
squares; exposure time paced by subject. It estimates were corrected for the statistical bias 
later reviewed by MacRae (1970a, 1970b). bb. Ellipses, their major axes being 3-4 inches in 
0.25-inch steps. cc. An ellipse tilted at either 40, 45, 50, 55, or 60 degrees. dd. Six shades of 
orange paper. ee. Three-degree-diameter spots of light. It reported here is an average over 
two subjects and is high due to sampling bias; the real value may be 2 bits/stimulus 
(MacRae, 1970b). ff. Projected circles of 4-53 cm diameter in 1-cm steps. Maximum 
exposure duration of 15 seconds. White light from projector. gg. Lines of 1-5 inches in 1-
inch steps. hh. Iconix photostimulator, diffuse screen; 3-250 ft.-L intensity. ii. Exposure 
duration not mentioned. Median value of transmitted information for 5 subjects, computed 
from the second half of the experiment. jj. Point-source LED with luminances of 1.030, 
2.318, 5.214, 11.73, 26.40, and 59.39 ft.-L. It reported here is an average over durations of 
1, 5, 15, 45, and 135 ms. kk. There were 9 stimuli, each the horizontal space between two 
white dots on a black background, presented on a computer monitor. It was averaged over 
24 subjects.
A Hidden Error in the Computation of Information Transmitted
The overestimation noted above was originally traced to a computational phenomenon
that has been well-explored in mathematical psychology. That is, there is a sampling
bias that gets worse as the total number of stimulus presentations used in computing It
shrinks relative to the number of stimulus categories multiplied by the number of
response categories. MacRae (1970a) reviewed the bias and its implications for the
behavior of It with increase in the number of judged stimuli. In actuality, the number
of judged stimuli (which is not the number of stimulus presentations) is usually also
the number of stimulus categories and also the number of response categories. Hence,
for a fixed total number of stimulus presentations, the overestimation of It increases
with the number of different stimuli employed. As such, as MacRae explained, the
degree of overestimation can be computed (under reasonable statistical assumptions)
and It adjusted accordingly. The stimulus information IS (equation 2) is predetermined
by the number of stimuli employed; recall that usually the n different stimuli are made
equiprobable, such that IS = log n. IS therefore has no sampling bias. But computation
of It (equation 4) also uses ES (equation 3), which is data-based and therefore biased.
Treating ES as a random variable with a known distribution allows estimation of the
bias and hence the needed adjustment to the respective Its. MacRae (1970a) applied
Channel Capacity or Memory Capacity? 21this method to published data and concluded that the channel capacity, the apparent
asymptote of It with increase in IS , was an artefact of sampling bias. Or, as Cronbach
(1955) had put it, the experimental design had been insufficiently penetrating, that is,
by failing to use enough stimulus presentations. In fact, for a typical absolute
judgment experiment, one that uses more than one human subject, the sampling bias
can be mitigated by computing It from a single confusion matrix, as if X subjects
judging Y presentations each were replaced by a single subject judging XY
presentations. In contrast, calculating Its separately for each subject and then
averaging the Its maintains (and, in fact, worsens) the sampling bias. This neatly
explains the differing curves found by Garner (1953).
Why, then, the continuing references to channel capacity, long after MacRae
(1970a)? For the same reason that these references occurred in the first place:
The view that transmission remains constant with increasing stimulus information survived in spite
of some contrary evidence because the usual effect of bias was to produce a μ-shaped curve with
sufficient irregularity for no trend to be compellingly evident. This allowed experimenters and
reviewers to plot a best-fitting horizontal line and identify it as the channel capacity ... When a
choice of curves was available to represent an experimental design the most flat-topped has usually
been chosen ... (MacRae, 1970a, p. 119)
That is, the warning offered by Garner’s (1953) computations either went unnoticed or
was intentionally ignored. Despite the eventual warnings of MacRae (1970a),
subsequent experimenters continued to use large numbers of stimuli in an apparent
effort to discern a channel capacity. For example, Russell and Marteniuk (1974) used
16, Ward (1991) used 21, and Mori and Ward (1995) used 16, all with subjects whose
training was merely typical.
Table 3: Maximum values of information transmitted, It in bits/stimulus, 
for senses other than hearing and vision.* 
Study Sense
Substance 
or 
treatment
Duration 
(ms)
Feedback 
(Y/N/U) It Note
Beebe-Center, 
Rogers, & 
O’Connell (1955)
Taste 
intensity Sucrose See note Y 1.6880 a, b
Salt See note Y 1.70 a, c
Sucrose & 
salt See note Y 2.2500 a, d
Engen & 
Pfaffmann (1959)
Odor 
intensity
Amyl 
acetate See note Y 1.52 e
Odor 
intensity N-heptanal See note Y 1.53 e
22 Lance NizamiOdor 
intensity N-heptane See note Y 1.51 e
Odor 
intensity
Phenylethyl 
alcohol See note Y 1.58 e
Engen & 
Pfaffmann (1960)
Odor 
quality See note See note Y 4.03 e, f, g
Odor 
quality See note See note Y 3.86 e, f, h
Hawkes & Warm 
(1960)
Electric 
current 
intensity
Electric 
current 500 See note 1.72 i
Bechinger, 
Kongehl, & 
Kornhuber (1969)
Rotation Rotation See note U 1.7 j
Time 
perception See note See note U 2.5 j
Marteniuk (1971) Arm movement See note See note U 2.48 k
Locke (1974) Time perception See note See note U 2.07 l
Russell (1981) Muscular force See note See note U 1.67 m
Sherrick (1985) Vibration Vibration rate See note Y 2.23 n
Blamey & Clark 
(1987)
Electric 
pulse-
train 
intensity
Electric 
current 300 Y 1.608 o
Electric 
pulse-
train 
intensity
Electric 
current 300 Y 1.02 p
Fulgosi, 
Bezinovic, 
Mimica, & Taksic 
(1987)
Lifted 
weight Weights See note N 1.91 q
Table 3: Maximum values of information transmitted, It in bits/stimulus, 
for senses other than hearing and vision.*  (Continued)
Study Sense
Substance 
or 
treatment
Duration 
(ms)
Feedback 
(Y/N/U) It Note
Channel Capacity or Memory Capacity? 23* Not all cited papers are discussed in the text, and vice versa. Whether feedback was given is 
indicated by Y (=Yes), N (=No), or U (=Unclear). Estimates may not have been corrected by 
their authors for the sampling bias noted by MacRae (1970a) and discussed in the text, 
which overestimates It .
Notes: a. Self-paced sipping of the solution followed by expectoration (“sip-and-spit”). 
Estimates of information transmitted were corrected, by Beebe-Center et al. (1955), for the 
sampling bias which was later reviewed by MacRae (1970a, 1970b). b. Nine concentrations 
of sucrose, from 1 to 115 grams sucrose per 100 ml tap water. c. Nine concentrations of 
NaCl, from 0.30 to 34.7 grams NaCl per 100 ml tap water. It  here was averaged over 2 
subjects. d. One, 4, 19, or 115 grams sucrose in all possible combinations with 0.30, 1.0, 4.8, 
or 34.7 grams NaCl, all per 100 ml tap water. e. Self-paced sniffing. f. Stimuli identified 
according to unique labels invented separately by each subject. g. Twenty-four odorants 
chosen for their differences in odor quality; unequal subjective intensities. h. Twenty-four 
odorants of similar odor quality (i.e., sweet, fruity); unequal subjective intensities. i. 
Feedback was given to one subject group but not to another, with no apparent difference in 
effect. Stimulus was a 1,500 Hz sinusoidal current with intensities between the detection 
threshold and the pain threshold. Electrodes were applied to the pad of the index finger and 
the palm of the same hand. j. Many details of the experiment were not specified by 
Bechinger et al. in their Brief Report. k. “Judgments of the extent to which their extended 
right arm was voluntarily moved in the horizontal plane” (Marteniuk, 1971, p. 69). The pace 
of the task was not described. l. Durations of 1 kHz tones presented at 70 dB SPL in each 
earphone of a headset. It  listed is for 9 tones evenly spaced between 0.10 and 1.90 seconds 
duration. For 3 tones (0.10, 1.0, and 1.90 seconds), It = 1.52; for 5 tones, It  = 1.99. m. 
Stimulus was described by Russell as torque. Subject’s wrist was placed in a vertical sling 
attached to a post, and his elbow rested on a table; subject exerted increasing downward 
force until experimenter indicated that target force had been reached and had to be 
identified. Self-paced. n. Stimulus was frequency of haversine waveform of vibration of a 
reed applied to the fingertip. Stimulus duration set by subject’s reaction time. o. Trains of 
biphasic electrical current pulses, varied in width of each pulse in order to vary current 
intensity. Electrodes at finger and wrist. It  averaged over 5 subjects. p. Trains of biphasic 
electrical current pulses, varied in number of pulses/second (pulse rate) in order to vary 
current “frequency.” Electrodes at finger and wrist. It averaged over 7 subjects. q. Weights 
of 22-292 grams. Comfortable pace set by the experimenter. r. Ten tastants in solution: 0.1 
M NaCl, 0.1 M KCl, 0.1 M MSG, 0.1 mM quinine HCl, 3.0 mM citric acid, 0.3 M sucrose, 
3.0 mM aspartame, NaCl-sucrose mixture, citric acid-sucrose mixture, quinine HCl-sucrose. 
Tastant concentrations in the mixtures were the same as in the single stimuli.
Hettinger, Gent, 
Marks, & Frank 
(1999)
Taste 
quality See note See note N 2.25 a, r
Table 3: Maximum values of information transmitted, It in bits/stimulus, 
for senses other than hearing and vision.*  (Continued)
Study Sense
Substance 
or 
treatment
Duration 
(ms)
Feedback 
(Y/N/U) It Note
24 Lance NizamiThe Actual Behavior of Information Transmitted in Absolute Judgments
The Role of the Subject’s Rate of Making Mistakes
It is generally acknowledged that the experimental subject makes mistakes in stimulus
identification. If we consider the rate at which the subject makes mistakes, and we
respect sampling bias, we can interpret how It changes with increase in number of
stimuli. If the rate of mistakes does not change, It will monotonically increase,
yielding an asymptotic channel capacity. As noted above, however, the latter is an
illusion. Hence, the subject does not make mistakes at a constant rate. Rather, as the
number of stimulus categories increases, some crucial number of categories will be
reached at which the subject’s rate of mistakes will have increased enough to make It
peak. Further increase in the number of categories will cause the rate of stimulus
misassignments to outstrip the growth of IS , so that It will then monotonically
decrease. Figure 7 illustrates the proposed interplay of IS and ES that produces the sort
of curve that characterizes It when data are corrected for the sampling bias.
The Change in the Rate of Making Mistakes
Why would mistakes be made at different rates? Ironically, the answer lies with
Garner and Hake (1951). They admitted that category or absolute judgments “are
probably made by comparing the present stimulus with some average subjective
standard” (Garner & Hake, p. 446). That is, the subject’s absolute judgments may
actually be comparisons. What then is being compared to what in the absolute
judgment experiment, in terms of actual events and outcomes? Empirically, a
detectable stimulus evokes a sensation. Generally, sensation rises monotonically with
intensity. Thus, to the experimental subject, the stimulus is a sensation and the
stimulus/response categories correspond to ranges of sensations; that is, the rows and
columns of the psychologist’s confusion matrix correspond to ranges of sensations.
The subject’s task is therefore to place a sensation within a sensation range. To do so,
the stimulus-evoked sensation is compared to what remains, in the subject’s mind, of
the sensations of the exemplar stimuli that were given during training and practice.
This comparison process is repeated many times in order to obtain the elements of the
confusion matrix.
Comparison gets harder as the number of categories increases. For example, when
there are just 4 categories, categorization by the subject will be easy. For 7 categories,
categorization becomes harder, but It may exceed the case for 4 categories because of
the rise in IS with rise in number of categories. By 12 categories, however, the rise in
IS is not enough to compensate for the rising value of ES , so that It drops. The reason
that performance is worse with 12 categories than with 7 is that the memory traces of
the exemplars are not as distinct for 12 categories as they were for 7 categories.
Channel Capacity or Memory Capacity? 25Figure 7. The interplay of stimulus information IS (equation 2) and stimulus equivocation ES (equation 3)
to produce information transmitted It = IS – ES (equation 4), with increase in the number of categories in
a category experiment. The stimuli are assumed to be presented with equal probabilities, and logarithms
to base 2 are used. The It curve is empirical, based on Garner (1953, figure 1) for the loudness of tones of
15-110 dB SPL and Beebe-Center et al. (1955) for saline solutions of 0.0030 - 0.347 kg/l. ES was not
given, and had to be inferred from IS and It .
The Role of Memory in Channel Capacity
What is Measured During Absolute Judgments?
Miller’s now-famous review of the Garner-Hake application of Shannon information
to perception (Miller, 1956a) not only introduced “the magical number seven,” it also
summarized some contemporary literature on memory capacity. Miller offered that
summary because he had found a curious coincidence, namely, that we can correctly
recall about 7 items, just as “there is a span of absolute judgment that can distinguish
about seven categories” (Miller, 1956a, p. 91). Elsewhere that same year, Miller
described how tests of memory capacity were done:
In the simplest test of mnemonic capacity, a sequence of symbols (usually decimal digits) is read
aloud or shown to the person at a regular rate (usually one per second) and at the end of the sequence
he is asked to repeat or write the symbols in the correct order. The experiment begins with short
sequences and increases the length [sic] until the person is no longer able to repeat the entire
sequence without error. This point is called the “span of immediate memory.” (Miller, 1956b, p. 131)
Miller (1956a) failed to mention that a great deal of evidence had accumulated
between 1887 and 1925 in favor of a memory span of 7 ± 2 items. Guilford and
Dallenbach (1925) summarized that evidence, obtained from 27 variations of the
method later described by Miller (1956b; above). Guilford and Dallenbach (1925)
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26 Lance Nizamisuggested that the memory tests lacked sufficient computational rigor, and should be
replaced by the limen: “The limen of immediate memory or the memory span is
defined as that length of series which has the probability 0.5 of being retained; in other
words, that length of series which is as likely to be remembered as not” (Guilford &
Dallenbach, p. 626). Guilford and Dallenbach obtained limens of 6.713 to 9.985
digits. In another experiment they found a limen of 7.583 digits. The 7 ± 2 span was
confirmed by Broadbent (1975) in a review of memory measurements which were
done from 1956 to 1973. Cowan (2000) thoroughly canvassed the literature since
Broadbent, and concluded that “there is a relatively constant limit in the number of
items that can be stored [in memory] in a wide variety of tasks” (Cowan, p. 88).
However, Cowan concluded that the limit was 4 ± 1 rather than 7 ± 2. Miller’s famous
7 ± 2 is then the sum of two memory groups, 4 ± 1 and 3 ± 1. Further, replacing
Miller’s 7 ± 2 by Cowan’s 4 ± 1 does not obviate a connection between memory
capacity and It . Numerous experiments have shown that the It that is typical for
minimally-trained subjects is 2 bits/stimulus, corresponding to 4 correctly identified
stimuli (e.g., Eriksen & Hake, 1955a; Hawkes & Warm, 1960; Tulving & Lindsay,
1967; Vianello & Evans, 1968; Bechinger et al., 1969; Landau et al., 1974; Locke,
1974, 1975; Fulgosi, Bezinovic, Mimica, & Taksic, 1987; Mori & Ward, 1992; Mori
& Ward, 1995; Hettinger, Gent, Marks, & Frank, 1999). It > 2 bits/stimulus likely
reflects greater practice by the subjects, as will be explored below (e.g., Pollack,
1953a; W.D. Ward, 1953; Hanes & Rhoades, 1959; Pylyshyn & Agnew, 1962;
Terman, 1965; Feallock, Southard, Kobayashi, & Howell, 1966; Friedman, 1967;
Steedman, 1967; Cuddy, 1968; Egeth & Pachella, 1969; Fulgosi & Bartolovic, 1971;
Heller & Auerbach, 1972; Fulgosi & Zaja, 1975; Fulgosi, Knezovic, & Zarevski,
1984; Fulgosi, Lugomer, & Fulgosi, 1986).
Memory Capacity Does Not Depend on Information Content
The provisional equality of information transmitted and memory capacity first noted
by Miller (1956a) seemed to imply two things. First, it seemed to imply that the
information load encapsulated within the memory capacity is constant; and secondly,
it seemed to imply that the memory load encapsulated within the maximum
information transmitted is constant. Regarding the latter possibility, Miller himself
noted that
If the amount of information in the span of immediate memory is a constant, then the span should be
short when the individual items contain a lot of information and the span should be long when the
items contain little information. (Miller, 1956a, p. 91)
Miller reviewed the literature and found that
It is the length of the sequence, rather than the amount of information per item, that is the critical
factor. For example, a person who can repeat nine binary digits will have a span of about eight
decimal digits, seven letters of the alphabet, or five monosyllabic English words. These represent 9,
25, 33, and about 50 bits [per stimulus of information transmitted], respectively. Clearly, the
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than when we measure it in terms of the amount of information stored. (Miller, 1956b, p. 131)
That is, the number of items correctly remembered is far less variable than their
information content, so that the amount of information carried within the memory
capacity is unlikely to be constant. Of course, this applies “when the material to be
learned does not form a familiar sequence” (Miller, 1956b, p. 133), that is, the
memorized material should not contain such things as words or known telephone
numbers, as “The organization into units is easier with familiar text than with random
sequences of symbols” (Miller, p. 134).
Miller’s conclusion was based upon papers such as that of Pollack (1953b), which
will now be described in order to demonstrate that Miller was right. Pollack gave his
subjects messages that were strings of equiprobable and randomly-ordered numerals
and consonants. The information in each message can be made to be independent of
message length, as follows. A message can be characterized by the number of choices
made between two equally-likely alternatives, that is, the stimulus information in bits.
For a simple message, for example, one of 8 equally-likely consonants or numerals, 3
choices are required in order to characterize the message, and the stimulus information
is log 2 8 = 3 bits. Alternatively, a message can be a string of three letters, each letter a
Y or an N, for which there is still 8 possible strings for which the order matters, so that
3 choices between 2 alternatives each are required to specify any given string, that is,
log 2 8 = 3 bits. In the actual experiment, strings of numerals and consonants were
dictated to the subjects at a reasonable pace. Each listener then wrote what they heard,
from which Pollack computed the Shannon information transmitted. The difference
between stimulus information and information transmitted was found to depend upon
message length, but not upon the number of possible alternatives per each constituent
item. That is, length was crucial to correct recall, but information content was not.
Information per item was then held constant, for which the stimulus information is log
([# alternatives/constituent]message length) = message length • [# alternatives/
constituent], that is, the stimulus information is directly proportional to the message
length. For those messages, It increased with message length up to 7-15 constituent
items, then gradually declined thereafter as the number of constituent items continued
to increase up to twenty-four.
It also transpired that for short messages having many alternatives per constituent
item, It was larger than for long messages with few alternatives per constituent item.
Altogether, Pollack showed that information content was not the crucial factor in
message recall.
The latter conclusion has since been solidly confirmed, for example by Slak
(1974) using several increasingly complicated sets of stimuli. The simplest consisted
of the numbers 0 and 1, as two equally likely alternatives thus having a stimulus
information of 1 bit/digit (21 = 2). Slak also employed the numerals 0, 1, 2, and 3 (2
bits/digit), the numbers 0-7 (3 bits/digit), and the numbers 0-9 together with the letters
u-z (altogether 4 bits/digit). Each set of stimuli was arranged into many strings, each a
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to 12 items in length. After each string was revealed the subject had to recall it. On
average, the subjects recalled correctly 7.92 items for the stimulus set having two
constituents, 6.68 items for the stimulus set having 4 constituents, 6.76 items for the
stimulus set having 8 constituents, and 6.15 items for the stimulus set having 16 digits.
In other words, 7 ± 1 digits were correctly remembered. In terms of a memory
capacity of 4 items (Cowan, 2000), the 7 correctly remembered digits was presumably
the sum of a group of 4 correctly remembered digits and a group of 3 correctly
remembered digits.
Memory is Crucial to Channel Capacity
There is firm evidence that memory capacity is independent of the information
content of messages. The converse question remains: Is maximum information
transmitted in absolute judgment experiments independent of memory capacity? To
answer this question, the present author reviewed roughly 60 empirical reports of
information transmitted in absolute judgment.
General evidence that memory is crucial to channel capacity. The absolute judgment
task predates Garner and Hake (1951). In a detailed review, Wever and Zener (1928)
concluded that absolute judgments involve some “mental formation through which
knowledge of the [stimulus] series is carried” (Wever & Zener, p. 471), formed only
after familiarization with all or most of the stimuli, and persisting for some time.
Wever and Zener found evidence for persistence from judgments of weights, evidence
replicated by Di Lollo (1964). Wever and Zener (1928) noted persistence for judged
frequency (pitch), data that was reinforced by Campbell, Lewis, and Hunt (1958) for
pitch and by Miller and Engen (1960) for identification of straight lines by their
lengths. Inadvertent evidence for memory involvement came from Klemmer and Frick
(1953), who had subjects perform a so-called “absolute judgment” task in which each
stimulus was one or more white dots inside a white square outline on a black
background, briefly flashed upon a screen. But rather than identifying the stimulus by
a name or a number, the subjects were required to simply record what they saw, that is,
reproduce what was in their immediate memory, on gridded paper. Comparison to
mental archetypes of stimuli was obviated. For each of numerous different numbers
and placements of dots, It turned out to be very close to IS , even what the latter rose to
8 bits/stimulus! That is, information transmission became extraordinarily good when
the memory strain involved in genuine absolute judgments was removed. The lower
Its found in standard absolute judgment scenarios suggests that memory strain is
inherent to absolute judgment. Klemmer and Frick (1953) was replicated and
extended by Petiot and Parrot (1980). What transpires when the need to remember a
set of learned archetypes is removed was also shown by Chapanis and Overbey
(1971). Their subjects identified 36 colors, covering the whole color spectrum. First,
however, a unique name, chosen to be as intuitive as possible, was given to each color.
Each stimulus was presented just once per trial block, and the subjects were given a
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also told the correct answer on each judgment. Overall, then, the subjects could
mentally check off the received stimuli. After at most 12 test blocks, the subjects all
gave perfect identifications, such that It = IS = log 2 36 = 5.17 bits. Naturally, It rose to
its maximum when memory strain was reduced to a minimum.
Rather than reducing memory load, Tulving and Lindsay (1967) added a
distraction to the absolute judgment task. Their subjects judged the intensities of
1 kHz tones (loudness) and white light patches (brightness). Either just tones were
presented, or just lights, or both simultaneously. In the latter case, the subjects either
judged just one stimulus type, or both, one after the other. Judging lights and tones
reduced the respective Its relative to the Its found when only one or the other had to be
judged. The same effect was subsequently found for sizes of black circles versus tone
frequencies. Tulving and Lindsay considered various models for their results, finally
concluding that
It is also possible that the bottleneck in information flow in the absolute judgment task involving
simultaneous stimuli from two modalities lies at the output side, and that the observed impairment in
performance under these conditions is attributable to response conflict or memory factors rather than
to perceptual processes. (Tulving & Lindsay, 1967, p. 109)
In other words, the observed restrictions on It were caused by distraction at the brain,
rather than information capacity at the sensory receptor. Egeth and Pachella (1969)
found a similar effect for tasted solutions that contained both salt and sugar and that
were judged on both saltiness and sweetness.
Particular evidence that memory is crucial to channel capacity. There are some
unique features of absolute judgment experiments that imply that memory plays a
crucial limiting role in absolute judgments. One feature is the effect of feedback.
Giving feedback means that the subject is informed, judgment by judgment, of the
correctness of their responses. Empirically, feedback improves the subjects’
correctness scores overall, hence improving It (e.g., Hartman, 1954; Engen &
Pfaffmann, 1959; Agnew, Pyke, & Pylyshyn, 1966; Friedman, 1967; Steedman, 1967;
Ward & Lockhead, 1970; Siegel, 1972; McNicol, 1975; Mori & Ward, 1995).
Certainly, no-one suggests that feedback should reduce It . The possibility of
improvement through feedback was ignored early on, such that many of the earliest It
estimates (i.e., some of the lowest values in Tables 1-3) likely represented minimal
values. Recall that calculating It (equation 4) requires knowing what was transmitted
and what was received. But the Shannon general communication system does not use
that knowledge, either symbol-by-symbol or even retroactively, to improve its
efficiency. Judgment-by-judgment feedback in absolute judgment thus violates the
Shannon general communication system, the model that underlies Shannon’s algebra.
However, this point is generally ignored in the absolute judgment literature; feedback-
influenced results are given equal weight to those that are not.
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judgment literature, that of practice. Since Garner and Hake (1951), psychologists
have taken the attitude that obtaining valid estimates of It from human subjects
requires only a brief initial familiarization of the subject with the absolute judgment
task, notwithstanding the number of the different stimuli to be categorized. It
transpires, however, that repeating the absolute judgments (with appropriate breaks)
improves It (e.g., Pollack, 1953a; W. D. Ward, 1953; Eriksen & Hake, 1955a; Hanes &
Rhoades, 1959; Pylyshyn & Agnew, 1962; Terman, 1965; Feallock et al., 1966;
Friedman, 1967; Steedman, 1967; Cuddy, 1968; Vianello & Evans, 1968; Egeth &
Pachella, 1969; Fulgosi & Bartolovic, 1971; Fullard, Snelbecker, & Wolk, 1972;
Heller & Auerbach, 1972; Fulgosi & Zaja, 1975; Costall, Platt, & MacRae, 1981;
Fulgosi et al., 1984; Fulgosi et al., 1986; Hettinger et al., 1999; Petrov & Anderson,
2005). Practice is a form of training, and training consolidates a task in memory. In
contrast, Shannon’s general communication system has no built-in learning
algorithms, and needs no training. Logically, then, a process that improves with
training can hardly be characterized by Shannon information measures. Further, after
discontinuation of practice, forgetting sets in, and absolute judgment performance
declines (Gibson, 1953), although the decline can be gradual; for example, the ability
to correctly identify sizes of discs, once learned, persisted for five weeks (Steedman,
1967). There is, however, no forgetting within a Shannon general communication
system. Human memory is imperfect; thus, no matter how good the subject’s training,
the dependence of It on the number of stimuli for an absolute judgment task (figure 7)
will always maximize and then decline; the peak will merely shift rightwards with
practice.
The Shannon general communication system has no emotional contents.
Therefore, for humans to be channels as imagined in the psychologist’s interpretation
of information transmission, the subject’s level of motivation cannot affect It . Among
psychologists, however, it is widely agreed that when subjects are better motivated,
they perform better, and that is true of absolute judgments (e.g., Rouder, Morey,
Cowan, & Pfaltz, 2004). Another interesting finding is that for a given number of
stimuli, It tends to increase with the physical range covered by those stimuli (e.g.,
Eriksen & Hake, 1955a; Pollack, 1956; Engen & Pfaffmann, 1959; Garner, Kaplan, &
Creelman, 1966; Mori & Ward, 1992; Brown, McCormack, Smith, & Stewart, 2005).
This is not a characteristic of the Shannon general communication system. In terms of
memory, however, there is a straightforward explanation; as the stimuli get farther
apart from each other, they are easier to tell apart, hence easier to recall. We might
therefore expect that if the number of stimuli drop but their physical separation
increases, then It remains constant. Alluisi (1957) confirmed that trade-off. 
There are also two kinds of shifts in performance that are peculiar to absolute
judgments. One is illustrated by Heintz’s experiments on absolute judgment of lifted
weight (Heintz, 1950). Heintz’s experiment was atypical in that Heintz’s subjects did
not do just the usual absolute judgments, but also did additional series in which a
heavier comparison weight was lifted before lifting and judging each of the test
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underestimated relative to when the comparison weight was absent. The comparison
weight was made heavier from session to session, and the underestimation, dubbed
contrast, became more extreme. Salzinger (1957) replicated contrast using heavier
comparison weights than Heintz. Now, in the Shannon general communication
system, the equivalent to judging only the test weights is to only receive the symbols
comprising the sent message, even if a fixed symbol (corresponding to the comparison
weight) is inserted between each transmitted symbol. Thus, if the human being is a
Shannon system, It should not have changed with the introduction of the comparison
weight in the Heintz experiment. But It did indeed change. One explanation for
Heintz’s findings is that the sensation of the comparison weight used in each session
was retained in memory and used as a reference standard in identifying the weights.
Besides contrast, another kind of shift in performance that is peculiar to absolute
judgments is the observed tendency, in the absence of an introduced standard, “for a
response to a given stimulus category to be higher when the preceding stimulus is
higher than the one being judged, and lower when the preceding stimulus is lower”
(Garner, 1953, p. 377). This is an example of sequential dependence, a known
property of absolute judgments (Tresselt, 1947) in which each judgment depends upon
the previous stimulus or stimuli, or even upon the responses given to those stimuli.
This particular sequential effect was dubbed assimilation. It occurs even when
subjects are given feedback (e.g., Holland & Lockhead, 1968), which should have
allowed the subjects to adjust their responses away from any systematic prejudices.
Both assimilation and contrast were found for lifted weights by Sherif, Taub, and
Hovland (1958), which was replicated and extended by Parducci and Marshall (1962).
Assimilation and contrast also occur for judged intensities of 1 kHz tones and for
judged lengths of lines (McKenna, 1984). Assimilation was also seen for durations of
a tone and for tone frequency (Brown et al., 2005), for line lengths (Rouder et al.,
2004), and for distances between spots of light (Petrov & Anderson, 2005), in
experiments in which contrast was not employed. Assimilation has no counterpart in a
Shannon general communication system. However, a sophisticated and elaborate
experiment on sequential dependences carried out by Luce, Nosofsky, Green, and
Smith (1982) implied that the stimulus on the trial preceding the one of interest acts as
a memory aid when the two stimuli are similar, and as a memory confuser when the
two stimuli differ. Certainly, if the preceding stimulus is the same as the given
stimulus, the latter is identified with much greater accuracy than otherwise (Costall et
al., 1981).
Another peculiar property of absolute judgments is that accuracy of identification
tends to be higher for the stimuli that have the lowest and highest values of the judged
physical characteristic, with a concomitant decrease in the variability of the assigned
identity. This phenomenon, called end-anchoring, was found by Pollack (1952,
1953a), Garner (1953), Eriksen and Hake (1955a), Engen and Pfaffmann (1959),
Pylyshyn and Agnew (1962), Terman (1965), Spitz (1967), Steedman (1967), Cuddy
(1968), Holland and Lockhead (1968), Snelbecker and Fullard (1972), Lacouture and
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Rouder et al. (2004), Brown et al. (2005), and Petrov and Anderson (2005), among
others. Eriksen and Hake (1955a) explained end-anchoring in a hypothesis that has
never been disproven. That is, in the absence of any introduced artificial comparison
stimulus, the lowest and highest stimuli in the employed stimulus set form natural
standards for judgment. The further the judged stimulus is from either of these end
standards, the less likely it will be correctly identified. Eriksen and Hake confirmed
their hypothesis through several experiments that are too elaborate to be described
here. Pollack (1953a) had already shown that end-anchoring decreased when the use
of end stimuli as standards was prevented or obstructed by various means. That
finding was confirmed by Cuddy (1968), Heller and Auerbach (1972), and Locke
(1975), among others. In another approach, the influence of the end stimuli can be
obviated by presenting a stimulus set having no apparent ends, such as the color wheel
of colors perceived by human subjects. Absolute judgment of colors from the color
wheel shows no obvious anchoring (Volkmann & Engen, 1961). It is also possible to
construct a set of complex tones that give the illusion of a “circle” of pitches. Using
such a stimulus set, no distinct anchoring appears (Costall et al., 1981). In a different
twist, Neath, Brown, McCormack, Chater, and Freeman (2006) found that the middle
stimulus (by judged characteristic) of an odd (i.e., uneven) number of different stimuli
is identified just as well as the end stimuli of the set, when that middle stimulus is
separated further than usual (by judged characteristic) from its nearest neighbors. This
occurred for four different judged characteristics: tone frequency, weight, rod length,
and numerosity of squares presented on a computer monitor. Hypothetically, making
the middle stimulus more perceptually distinct aided its remembrance and hence its
identification (Neath et al., 2006).
Perhaps the most conclusive single set of experiments on absolute judgments was
that of Siegel (1972). Siegel’s experiments concerned all of feedback, sequential
dependences, and anchoring. Siegel tested a crucial hypothesis: that when subjects are
told the correct answer after each judgment (feedback), the correct answer is
remembered and makes that particular stimulus easier to identify on its next
appearance. Of course, memories fade, so the strength of the effect should decline as
the retention interval between any two identical test stimuli lengthens. That is, the
smaller the retention interval, the higher should be the information transmitted by that
stimulus. And, broadly, this is what Siegel found. Siegel (1972) bolstered his results
through three further similar experiments. Altogether, he concluded that “If there is a
channel capacity for absolute judgments of unidimensional stimuli, it is an asymptote
on forgetting” (Siegel, p. 125). Siegel’s findings were confirmed by Aiken, Abrams,
and Shennum (1973). His finding of greater accuracy for zero retention interval than
for longer intervals was repeated by Costall et al. (1981).
So far, we have only considered stimuli that vary along one physical dimension,
such as the intensity or frequency of an auditory stimulus or a reflected light, or the
concentration of a substance in a liquid solution (for odors or tastes), or even the
length of a straight line. However, stimuli used for absolute judgments can be made to
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categorizes each dimension in turn. For example, for a tone, the experimenter can
change both the intensity and the frequency, and the subject then categorizes each tone
by its intensity and then by its frequency (or vice versa). There are multidimension
versions for equations (2-4) that can be used to compute It (e.g., Attneave, 1959). For
each individual physical dimension, It is still calculated using equations (2-4). The
unidimension Its computed from stimuli that are varied in more than one dimension
(1) are empirically less than found in experiments where only one dimension is varied,
and (2) sum (across dimensions) to less than the multidimension It (e.g., Pollack,
1953a; Pollack & Ficks, 1954; Beebe-Center et al., 1955; Eriksen & Hake, 1955b;
Garner & Creelman, 1964; Lockhead, 1966; Egeth & Pachella, 1969; Fulgosi, Bacun,
& Zaja, 1975). The connection to identification is that “Our high level of performance
in identifying human faces, speech sounds, and other familiar stimuli is probably
attributable to the fact that such objects differ from one another on a very large
number of observational dimensions” (Attneave, 1959, p. 76). A stimulus identified
by multiple characteristics is more likely to be correctly categorized by comparison to
stored archetypes involving multiple features than will a stimulus identified by one
feature within a set of archetypes that vary just in that one feature.
There is yet another phenomenon of absolute judgment experiments that favors a
memory interpretation of those judgments. Note that in psychophysics generally, one
stimulus can impede some psychological aspect of another stimulus. When simple
detection or discrimination tests are done, for example, the interference is called
masking, and the relevant stimuli are called the masker stimulus and the masked
stimulus. Those stimuli need not be simultaneous; perceptual masking can occur when
the masker precedes the masked stimulus (forward masking) and even when the order
is reversed (backward masking). Remarkably, masking also happens in absolute
judgments. The masker accompanies each stimulus to be judged, and the masking
shows as a significant drop in It. Ward (1991) found backward masking of absolute
judgments of tone intensity (loudness) for tones that were followed by a broadband
noise (a hiss). Mori and Ward (1992) demonstrated simultaneous, forward, and
backward masking of absolute judgments of tone intensity (loudness) for tones
masked by broadband noise. The physiological loci of forward and simultaneous
masking are still debated. However, backward masking is thought to occur
physiologically centrally, involving memory, rather than peripherally (see Nizami,
Reimer, & Jesteadt, 2002). Thus apparently the processes responsible for It in absolute
judgments are more likely to be central, like memory, rather than peripheral. The
effect of masking can be treated as a form of the contrast seen with lifted weights (see
above), as follows. In the Shannon general communication system, the equivalent to
judging only the test tones is to only receive the symbols comprising the sent message,
even if a fixed symbol (corresponding to the forward or backward masking noise) is
inserted between each transmitted symbol. Thus, if the human being is a Shannon
system, It should not have changed with the introduction of the forward or backward
noise masker. But It did indeed change, so we may speculate that the sensation of the
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standard in identifying the tones.
Finally, sensory memory is generally independent of stimulus duration. Thus, if It
from absolute judgments is memory-dependent, then it too should be independent of
stimulus duration, insofar as the stimulus is made long enough to not affect its
perceivability. When the latter condition is indeed met, independence of It from
duration is confirmed (e.g., Garner & Creelman, 1964; Garner et al., 1966; Egeth &
Pachella, 1969; Ward, 1991). In comparison, when a visual stimulus is not easily
perceived due to insufficient contrast, then the duration, contrast, and range of the
employed stimulus trade off, such that increasing each such characteristic tends to
improve It (Garner et al., 1966).
So, What Is the Channel/Memory Capacity?
In the literature on absolute judgments, the empirical values of information
transmitted It were always found to be less than their possible maxima, the values of
the stimulus information IS . The explanation proffered was always some version of
the following: “In the process of transforming physical energy into physiological
energy and judgments, a significant amount of information is lost” (Fulgosi et al.,
1986, p. 380). In short, the human being was treated as what engineers term a “lossy
transmission line.” However, the present paper has summarized a great deal of
empirical evidence for an alternative interpretation: that It is determined by memory
capacity, not by channel capacity. Tables 1, 2, and 3 show that It appears to have a
minimum around 2 bits/stimulus, corresponding to 4 perfectly identifiable categories.
Those 4 categories correspond to contemporary assessments of memory capacity (e.g.,
Cowan, 2000). Thus, channel capacity equals memory capacity. But tables 1, 2, and 3
also show that information transmitted can greatly exceed 2 bits/stimulus, such that
channel capacity would greatly exceed memory capacity. The improvement in It
seems largely due to practice, as reviewed above. Practice consolidates a task in
memory; hence, improvement in channel capacity depends upon improvement in
memory. How can memory improve while memory capacity remains constant? A
solution, to which no contrary evidence has yet arisen, came from a remarkable
memory experiment done by Ericsson, Chase, and Faloon (1980), in which the single
experimental subject was able to increase his memory capacity for random digits from
7 digits to 80 digits over the course of 20 months. The subject achieved the 80-digit
capacity by dividing the stream of digits into 7 supergroups of three groups of 3 or 4
digits per group, plus a final group of 5 digits. The subject’s behavior gave no reason
to believe that their capacity of immediate memory had ever exceeded 4 ± 1 digits; the
storage of digits in groups was attributed to long-term memory. Improvements in It
with practice likely represent a similar phenomenon, by which It and channel capacity
can continue to improve while memory capacity remains constant. Recall that in the
plot of empirical It versus number of categories (figure 7), the peak of the It curve
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capacity increases.
The idea that psychological channel capacity reflects memory capacity will be a
surprise to some experimental psychologists. Consider a brief review by Shiffrin and
Nosofsky (1994) in the influential journal Psychological Review. Comparing channel
capacity to memory capacity, Shiffrin and Nosofsky sardonically concluded that “the
relation between these two limitations remains somewhat less tight than some might
view as desirable, chiefly consisting of the fact that both involve numbers less than
ten” (Shiffrin & Nosofsky, p. 360). Shiffrin and Nosofsky did acknowledge (much
more briefly than done here) some of the idiosyncracies of absolute judgments, such
as range effects, practice effects, end-anchoring, and sequential dependences. They
especially dwelled upon the greater It found for multidimension versus unidimension
stimuli. But Shiffrin and Nosofsky discuss little of how these phenomena might relate
to memory, while pointing out that there are aspects of memory performance that do
not seem to easily connect to aspects of absolute judgments. In light of all of the
evidence summarized herein, Shiffrin and Nosofsky’s conclusion of no connection
seems extraordinary.
Summary
Over 60 years ago, Dr. Claude Shannon produced a groundbreaking paper on the
computation of the information transmitted by a general communication system. That
now-famous method was adopted, with some reinterpretations, by the experimental
psychologists Garner and Hake as a way of analyzing absolute judgments (Garner &
Hake, 1951). The Garner-Hake approach is still employed. In it, a human subject is
typically presented with a set of stimuli varying in one or more dimensions within a
single sense (vision, hearing, taste, smell, touch, or kinesthesis). The stimuli are
assigned categories by the experimenter. Each stimulus is then presented to the subject
multiple times in randomized order, one stimulus at a time, and the subject must
identify it by category. A Shannon-style confusion matrix is formed, its columns
representing the given stimuli and its rows representing the identification categories,
all labeled in the order of the varied stimulus characteristic. The matrix entries are the
proportion of times that the experimental subject identifies a given stimulus as being
in a given category. The confusion matrix allows computation of Shannon’s
information transmitted measure, It ; subjects’ performances are also scored as the
percentages of correct assignments of stimulus to category (correct identifications). It
allegedly reaches an eventual maximum, the channel capacity, as the number of
stimuli increases, reflecting a maximum number of stimuli that can be consistently
identified correctly. The present author examined the behavior of It by critically
reviewing 60 years of absolute judgment literature. Empirically, percentage correct
identifications and It both grow when subjects are given judgment-by-judgment
feedback as to judgment correctness. (Feedback is a concept embraced in cybernetics,
but it is not a feature of the Shannon general communication system.) Stimulus
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range and spacing of the stimuli. Anchor effects are found in which a stimulus, or even
a response, affects the identification of a later stimulus. Masking is found, in which
identification can be affected by noise that appears before, or even after, the stimulus
to be judged. (Non-simultaneous noise is not a feature of Shannon’s general
communication system.) Further, intensive training can increase performance far
beyond the typical average of 4, or at best 7, consistently correctly identified stimuli;
no actual channel capacity is evident. All of these behaviors are incompatible with the
operation of the Shannon general communication system. They can, however, be
explained if the absolute judgment experiment is viewed as a test of human memory.
Memory capacity has been quantified for decades in other psychology experiments.
Those studies suggest that without special training only 7 stimuli, and perhaps really
just 4, can be consistently correctly identified—precisely the numbers that are
typically found in absolute judgment experiments under basic familiarization.
Discussion
Continuing Use of the Garner-Hake Method of Analysis of Absolute Judgments
Given the gradual accumulation of a great mass of solid evidence against a channel-
capacity interpretation of Garner-Hake information-transmission computations, it
might be thought that the Garner-Hake approach would be abandoned. Not so. The
channel-capacity interpretation of sensation is still very much alive. For example, on
the theory side, Wong and Norwich (1997), Norwich, Wong and Sagi (1998), Sagi,
Wong, and Norwich (2001), and Sagi and Norwich (2002) all accept the Garner-Hake
use of Shannon information at face value. Norwich et al. (1998), Sagi et al. (2001),
and Sagi and Norwich (2002) reiterated the old belief that transmitted information It
reaches an asymptotic plateau, and Sagi et al. (2001) went even further, seeking to
justify the belief in an informational plateau by using theory and simulations. Then
there are the experiments. Since the early 1970’s, for example, Lawrence Ward and his
co-authors have turned out no fewer than 10 peer-reviewed journal papers regarding
information transmission in absolute judgments, of which four are presently cited.
That is not the behavior of investigators who realize the connection of channel
capacity to memory capacity, because absolute judgments themselves are hardly
needed to quantify memory. Granted, there is a relatively recent, lively, and ongoing
debate about how absolute judgments are actually made, and therefore what mental
resources they rely upon (for an example, see Brown, Marley, Dodds, and Heathcote,
2009). But, the relevant papers often contain elaborate conceptual models, sometimes
accompanied by equally elaborate mathematical models and computer routines, all of
which are not likely to be transparent to a general audience, and that are well beyond
the scope of the present review.
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Information Theory
Garner and Hake (1951) proposed an intimate connection of Shannon information
theory to sensation. However, Garner and Hake were experimentalists, not
mathematicians, and their ideas found greatest acceptance among other
experimentalists. Therefore, the present paper concentrated on the use of the Garner-
Hake approach by experimentalists. Doubtless, the experimentalists would benefit
nonetheless from any greater theory of perception that justified the Garner-Hake
interpretation of Shannon information theory. In fact, an a posteriori justification for
the Garner-Hake approach has been presented in a long-lived stream of ongoing
theory papers entitled “The Entropy Theory of Perception,” produced by K. H.
Norwich and co-authors (with some independent contributions being made by
Norwich’s former students and associates, e.g., Mori, 1993; Schulze & Mori, 1993;
Wong & Figuieredo, 2002; Wong 2005, 2007). Norwich et al.’s entropy theory
actually derives from 1958 (noted in Norwich, 1993), just ten years after Shannon’s
seminal paper, but the entropy theory first appeared in print in 1975 (Norwich, 1975).
The theory prescribes perceptual response using “a mathematical function similar to
Shannon’s informational entropy function” (Norwich, 2005, p. 176). The
mathematical function in question ultimately depends upon the Garner-Hake
interpretation of Shannon information theory (Norwich 1987, 1991a, 1991b, 1991c,
2001, 2005; Norwich & Wong, 1997). The entropy theory was based on several
notions, namely, that (1) “multiple, parallel receptor-neuron units” (Norwich, 1981, p.
414) without collaterals “carry essentially the same message to the brain,”(p. 414); (2)
sensation is proportional to the firing rate of the neuron abutting the sensory receptor;
(3) neuronal firing rate is proportional to the sensory receptor’s resolvable
uncertainty; and (4) the resolvable uncertainty is computed from Shannon information
theory. The uncertainty, which Norwich called H (which he identified with ES of text
equation 3), allegedly depends upon microscopic thermodynamic fluctuations of the
stimulus. H decreases with time through repeated and regular sampling of the stimulus
by the sensory receptor. That is, exposing the single sensory receptor with its single
primary afferent (Norwich, 1981) to a constant stimulus causes firing-rate adaptation,
in which a sensory neuron’s firing rate hypothetically drops smoothly and
monotonically from an initial maximum to a steady minimum. Thus, “If a given
stimulus is left in place for a prolonged period, uncertainty, H, and hence impulse
frequency, F, decrease progressively. The informational explanation for the
phenomenon of sensory adaptation is, therefore, a progressive increase in the certainty
of the sensory receptor [i.e., a decrease in entropy] about the magnitude of its
stimulus” (Norwich & McConville, 1991, p. 152). Norwich joined neuronal
adaptation to adaptation of sensation by noting that the physiological adaptation curve
has the same general shape as the psychophysical adaptation curve, that is, the drop in
sensation with time for a constant stimulus (Norwich, 1981). One adaptation
phenomenon was assumed to mirror the other. Altogether, in the entropy theory,
38 Lance Nizamineuronal entropy and psychophysical (sensation) entropy both hypothetically decrease
over time, and at the same rate.
The entropy theory was promoted in roughly 40 abstracts, proceedings, and peer-
reviewed papers, the most recent being Norwich (2010). However, one paper has long
been recognized as key, Norwich’s “Perception & Psychophysics” paper of 1981. That
paper drew the scrutiny of an expert on Garner-Hake computation, Dr. A. W. MacRae.
After a thorough examination of the paper, MacRae concluded that the entropy theory
was “nonsensical, having no clear meaning” (MacRae, 1982, p. 593). Nevertheless,
additions to the entropy theory continued to appear in print, and in 1993 Norwich
published a book that summarized most of the entropy theory work up to that time
(with the unexplained exception of a paper by Norwich in 1984). The book was
reviewed by a Cambridge mathematician, Donald Laming, who concluded that “It
does not transpose into any coherent theory of perception” (Laming, 1994, p. 1494).
Another review, by the established experimental psychologist F. Gregory Ashby,
concluded that “Many current psychophysicists and cognitive scientists will find their
views to be incompatible with the basic tenets of Norwich’s book” (Ashby, 1995,
p. 613).
Surprisingly, crucial assumptions underlying the entropy theory were not put to
experimental test until 1991. Then, L. M. Ward compared the drop in H for absolute
judgments over time to the adaptation with time of neuronal firing rate (Ward, 1991).
According to the entropy theory, these follow the same time course. For Ward’s
stimuli, time was manifested as a variable through different stimulus durations, as
modeled in the entropy theory (Norwich, 1981). That is, absolute judgments of stimuli
of different durations were used to yield H as a function of time. For primary afferent
firing rate vs. time, empirical plots were available from the literature. The behavior of
H with stimulus duration was examined separately for light and sound. For either,
psychophysical H adapted much faster than neuronal firing rate, and further, the
respective lags were not constant. Thus the Norwich et al. requirement of
synchronicity of firing rate and absolute judgment entropy was disconfirmed.
The omission of the material of Norwich (1984) from his book of 1993 allowed
Laming (1994) to miss an egregious mathematical error that had been committed in
Norwich (1984), namely, that Norwich’s very first equation was demonstrably
incorrect, rendering the rest of the paper superfluous (Nizami, 2009a). Other recent
analyses have demonstrated that the entropy theory fails to provide a consistent
interpretation of the Shannon general communication system (Nizami, 2008a), and
that it fails to fulfill a requirement of any model said to be based solely upon
information theory, that is, avoidance of the use of mechanisms (Nizami, 2008b; recall
that Shannon information is a mechanism-independent statistic). The entropy theory
allegedly produces the Weber fraction for audition (McConville, Norwich & Abel,
1991), but that derivation actually contains indisputable mathematical and conceptual
errors (see Nizami, 2008c); a later, somewhat different entropy theory derivation of
the same quantity depended crucially on a broad assumption that has proven, upon
testing, to be unjustified (Nizami, 2009b). Further, throughout the entirety of the
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simultaneously derived two well-known laws of sensation, Stevens’ power law and
the Weber-Fechner law. Remarkably, Norwich et al. never tested those claims against
data. The latter test was recently done by the present author, and the entropy theory
claims proved false (Nizami, 2009c). Also, a derivation of equal-loudness contours
within the entropy theory (Wong & Norwich, 1995) is actually based on inappropriate
limits and provably false assumptions (Nizami, 2009d). Finally, it transpires that the
entropy theory’s concept of sensory adaptation as information transmission has a
hidden drawback that makes it unsuitable for the majority of the published data
(Nizami, 2009e), regardless of any root concerns about the theory’s derivations. In
short, several workers with mathematical backgrounds have demonstrated over the
years that the entropy theory contains intractable problems.
In fairness it should be noted that the entropy theory was preceded by an attempt
by J. C. Baird to connect Garner-Hake information computation to empirical laws
governing the growth of sensation with growth of stimulus intensity, and the
discriminable steps in that growth (Baird, 1970a, 1970b). Unfortunately, Baird’s
efforts contained fatal flaws in reasoning (MacRae, 1972). The separate failures of
Baird and of Norwich et al. are altogether highly illuminating. That is, those theories
were clearly intended to provide the ultimate generalization of the Garner-Hake
interpretation, but they inadvertently did the opposite: they showed, should any
further demonstration be needed, that applying Shannon information theory to
absolute judgments has nothing whatsoever to do with actual information
transmission through communication channels.
Conclusions and Recommendations
For 60 years, psychologists have processed the results of absolute judgment
measurements using the Garner-Hake interpretation of Shannon’s information theory,
on the unsubstantiated assumption that humans are communication channels and that
performance on absolute judgments reflects the operation of such channels.
Examination of a substantial portion of the relevant literature reveals a great deal of
evidence that absolute judgments are limited by memory, rather than the capacity of a
Shannon general communication channel. The information transmission analyses
reveal not the channel capacity but rather the memory capacity of human subjects. The
memory capacity had already been confirmed many times over using methods other
than information-theoretic analyses of absolute judgments. Thus, the latter procedure
is redundant and needs to be abandoned in the absence of any other developed use in
psychology. Indeed, its use has distracted psychologists from other potential
interpretations of cognitive abilities.
Why was “information” adopted and retained by experimental psychologists?
Perhaps, as Collins mused, because
40 Lance NizamiInformation was reassuringly grounded in material entities—the telephone wire, the computer, and
the neuron—that spanned the human-made and the natural. Information did not respect apparent
barriers such as the skin or the skull, and it was a concept readily applied to events inside and outside
the person. (Collins, 2007, p. 58) 
Psychologists continue to speak of channel capacity, but it has slowly become
apparent that “Information was required to address a diversity of psychological issues
that its narrower definition could not sustain” (Collins, 2007, p. 47). In some quarters,
realization dawned early; in an editorial entitled “The Bandwagon,” Claude Shannon
himself noted the usefulness of information theory to engineering, but warned that
“Workers in other fields should realize that the basic results of the subject are aimed in
a very specific direction, a direction that is not necessarily relevant to such fields as
psychology, economics, and other social sciences” (Shannon, 1956, p. 3). On the same
page Shannon complained that “the subject of information theory has certainly been
sold, if not oversold.” In 1998, the same journal, IEEE Transactions on Information
Theory, produced an issue devoted entirely to summarizing information theory’s
applications and accomplishments on the 50th Anniversary of Shannon’s
breakthrough. Not one paper concerned the social sciences. The introductory editorial
briefly acknowledged that information theory had found early applications in
psychology, but concluded that “Information Theory eventually failed to become the
‘theory of everything’ that a few had envisioned” (Verdu, 1998, p. 2042). Indeed, as
Rosen had noted:
It is well known that “information” is one of the murkiest and most overworked words in the
scientific lexicon (perhaps only the word “model” can be compared to it). Indeed, there is almost no
relation between the “information” of the Information Theory of Shannon (which beguiles many
through its superficial relation to [thermodynamic] entropy), the “genetic information” upon which
development, physiology and evolution devolve in their several ways, and the “information”
appearing diversely in the functioning of the brain. (Rosen, 1985, p. 34)
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